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Naveh: The Paradox of Regulating Lobbying through Legislation

THE PARADOX OF REGULATING
LOBBYING THROUGH LEGISLATION
Shirley Naveh*
I. INTRODUCTION

This Article points at an alleged paradox of regulating lobbying
through legislation and suggests several explanations. This alleged
paradox is based on the public-choice approach to legislation and
lobbying according to which, lobbyists who serve interest groups
constitute a predominant player with crucial influence on the promotion
or non-promotion of bills. At the same time, legislation that regulates
lobbying by imposing duties and costs on lobbyists is actively promoted
and constantly expanding globally.1 It may be argued that the regulation
of lobbying conflicts with the legislators' interests because such
regulation might restrict their negotiating freedom as well as their gains
from "selling" legislation to interest groups. If that were the case,
we would expect both lobbyists and legislators to prevent laws to that
effect from materializing; yet, such legislation is introduced and
even expanding.
One possible explanation of that paradox wishes to question the
fundamental assumptions of the public choice approach, whereby the
legislators' market is dominated by interest groups while politicians, by
nature, exclusively promote their own self-interests. This Article will not
* Member of Academic Staff, Sapir Academic College; External Lecturer, Herzliya
Interdisciplinary Center. I would like to extend my thanks to Professor Eli Salzberger and Professor
Omri Yadlin for their constructive comments.
1. The United States was the first to legislatively regulate lobbying, more than a century ago.
In the 1990s, it was followed by Canada and Germany; and in the 2000s, the issue became regulated
in many other countries including Poland, Hungary, Taiwan, Lithuania, Australia, Slovenia,
Montenegro, Austria, Georgia, and Israel. Laws introduced in these countries cite the lobbyists'
duty to disclose and report on their activities to the lobbied bodies (some countries impose such
duties only vis-A-vis the legislative branch, while others also name the executive branch among the
recipients). Disclosure requirements may include the duty to disclose the lobbied issues, file detailed
expense and campaigning reports, and so on. For additional information see RAI CHARI, JOHN
HOGAN & GARY MURPHY, REGULATING LOBBYING: A GLOBAL COMPARISON 18-19 (Manchester

Univ. Press, 2012).

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 2018

1

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 47, Iss. 2 [2018], Art. 9

HOFSTRA LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 47:705

address that explanation. Furthermore, my basic assumption is that the
2
legislation market actually follows the economic theory of legislation.
This Article therefore focuses on another possible explanation whereby
legislation that restricts lobbyists is largely endorsed because it promotes
the common interests of lobbyists and legislators alike. 3
This Article offers five possible explanations of the aforementioned
alleged paradox that point at the legislators' and lobbyists' interests
in promoting legislation that regulates lobbying4 two explanations
that focus on the lobbyists' interests and three that focus on the
legislators' interests.5
II. THE PARADOX PRESENTED
The phenomenon of interest groups that employ lobbyists to
influence policymaking and promote legislation has expanded over the
past decade and is currently an inherent part of the democratic process.
For the most part, lobbyists are hired by commercially-oriented interest
groups to directly address policy-makers whose decisions could have an
impact on the interests of those groups.6 Lobbyists may promote
legislation that either uphold the groups' interests or prevent harm to

2. Economic theories that address legislation issues view laws as commodities acquired by
certain groups or coalitions of groups that bid high for legislation and thus overpower groups that
oppose specific laws or wish to procure other laws in the same field. These theories refer to groups
that wish to procure legislation as "interest groups" (organizations comprising two or more
individuals who share goals and wish to promote them by actively attempting to influence public
policies; see YAEL YISHAY, INTEREST GROUPS IN ISRAEL- A TEST OF DEMOCRACY passim
(1986)), while naming the legislators, "sellers." Those "sellers"-i.e., legislators or politicians-act
as quasi-brokers on the legislation market, seek parties that may be interested in laws that they have
to offer, and intend to sell the required product. In exchange, the sellers collect material or economic
benefits (e.g., funds for their campaigns) or non-material benefits (e.g., a promise to support
politicians in the following election), as market forces of supply and demand keep the legislation
market balanced. For further reading see generally JAMES M. BUCHANAN & GORDON
TULLOCK, THE CALCULUS OF CONSENT: LOGICAL FOUNDATIONS OF CONSTITUTIONAL
DEMOCRACY (1962); George J. Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, BELL J. ECON. &
MGMT. SCI., Spring 1971, at 3.
3. "Interest Groups" is a collective term denoting groups that wish to promote given
interests, whatever they may be. The term does not imply negative aspects as such since groups may
wish to promote laws that promote public good or address environmental issues to make the world a
better place. See Robert D. Tollison, Public Choice and Legislation, 74 VA. L. REv. 339, 341
(1988).
4. Lobbying is a broad field and can exist on all government levels. Lobbyists, therefore,
may address various players, including legislators, members of the executive, and so on. The
regulation of lobbying activities may, therefore, vary and comprise in-house ethical codes, rules,
regulations, and so on. This Article focuses on lobbying that targets legislators and its regulation
through legislation.
5. See infra Part M.
6. CHARI, HOGAN & MURPHY, supra note 1, at 3-4.
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those interests. Their counterparts are politicians who benefit from
lobbyists' acts on the political arena since they could help politicians
promote their personal interests (re-election, gaining political clout, etc.).
According to the economic theory of legislation, interest groups
follow a pattern known as rent-seeking, in which they "acquire"
legislation that promotes their interests using a "currency" that could
promote the legislators' own interests.7 Legislators, therefore, benefit
from the lobbyists' acts on the political arena as they help them finance
8
campaigns, guarantee votes, and so on. Thus, legislators "sell"
legislation and policies to interest groups that, in return, bolster their
political standing. The presence of active lobbyists on a political arena
attests to the existence of rent-seeking processes. 9
The key objection to the lobbying process is that the legislation it
produces, as well as other public decisions made under its influence,
reflect the narrow interests of those lobbyists and their senders and
might ignore public interests.1" Thus, politicians who succumb to
pressure from interest groups and lobbyists practically take public
wealth from society as a whole and surrender it to specific groups while
often conflicting with public interests.
Thus, the manner in which legislators and other policy-makers
make decisions and the operating tactics of lobbyists are criticized.
Attempting to gain greater control of that process, many countries
introduced laws that regulate the lobbyists market by imposing
disclosure and transparency duties as well as ethical codes and rules of
conduct. 1 Such legislation presumably increases the transparency levels
7. See generally Arye L. Hillman, Rent Seeking, in THE ELGAR COMPANION TO PUBLIC
CHOICE 307 (2d ed., 2010); Richard A. Posner, Theories of Economic Regulation, BELL J.
ECO. & MGMT. So., Autumn 1974, at 335.
8. Doemberg & McChesney and Shaviro referred to legislators as "sellers." See
Richard L. Doernberg & Fred McChesney, On the Accelerating Rate and Decreasing
Durability of Tax Reform, 71 MINN. L. REV. 913, 926-34 (1987); Daniel Shaviro, Beyond
Public Choice and Public Interest: A Study of the Legislative Process as Illustrated by Tax
Legislation in the 1980s, 139 U. PENN. L. REV. 1, 64-66 (1990). Lobbyists were also called
"brokers." See ROBERT MCCORMICK & ROBERT TOLLISON, POLITICIANS, LEGISLATION, AND
THE ECONOMY: AN INQUIRY INTO THE INTEREST-GROUP THEORY OF GOVERNMENT 3-6
(1981). Shaviro maintains that the difference is mainly semantic and argues that, brokers or
sellers, they are still politicians who make mutually-beneficial deals with lobbyists at the
public's expense. Id. at 3-7. Others maintain that the gap between these two names is
substantial. See Jonathan R. Macey, Promoting Public-Regarding Legislation Through
Statutory Interpretation:An Interest Group Model, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 223, 232 (1986).
9. See generally Hillman, supra note 7.
10. See Richard Hall & Alan V. Deardorff, Lobbying as Legislative Subsidy, 100 AM. POL.
SCI. REV.69, 69-70 (2006).
11. See CHARi, HOGAN & MURPHY, supra note 1, at 5-8. The scope of lobbying-regulating
rules vary from one democracy to another, but all the laws that address it employ similar rhetoric
and terms such as transparency, reporting, and responsibility. Two basic types of legal tools can be
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of decision-making processes, imposing costs on lobbyists that,
theoretically at least, conflict with their own interests.
If this is the case and lobbyists who represent interest groups do
control legislators-how could legislation that conflicts with lobbyists'
own interests be introduced? Furthermore, legislation that imposes
disclosure and reporting duties while restricting lobbyists' entry might
conflict with the legislators' interests since, potentially, laws that make
the activities of lobbyists and legislators transparent might impair on the
latter's operations behind the scenes and draw public criticism. If the
legislators' activities are exposed to the public, their negotiating
flexibility might diminish and their profits from "selling" legislation to
interest groups might decline-or might they?
As noted, a potential answer here may question some basic
assumptions-for example that the legislation market is dominated by
interest groups or that politicians by nature wish only to promote their
personal interests. This Article will not address that answer.
Furthermore, my basic assumption is that the legislation market indeed
follows the rules of the economic theory of legislation. In this Article, I
shall focus on different explanations of the aforementioned alleged
paradox and argue that legislation that restricts the activities of lobbyists
works because it serves the interests of lobbyists and legislators alike."2
This line of thought will have to illuminate the advantages that such
legislation offers both parties and show it is their most effective option.
As stated, lobbying may take place on every government level and
lobbied parties may be members of the legislative, the executive, the
judiciary, and other government bodies. Similarly, lobbying activities
could be regulated by means such as in-house ethical codes, sets of rules,
or specific regulations.13 Based on the public-choice paradigm and the
economic theory of legislation, legislators are key decision-makers14 and
therefore key targets for interest groups or for lobbyists who represent

identified in those rules: barriers, and registration and transparency duties. Barriers are sets of rules
that define practices that regulation is meant to prevent, ban the presentation of false information or
extending gifts and other benefits in the process, and specify cooling periods. Alternatively,
"disclosure duties" do not ban certain activities, but require that information on the lobbying process
be accessible to the public and demand, for example, that details of promoted issues, the lobbyists'
clients, the sums they are paid, and their lobbying activities be revealed. The most basic requirement
in this field is that lobbyists undergo registration. It appears in all lobbying regulations. For more on
this issue see Shirley Naveh, The Paradox of Lobbying Regulation (2015) (unpublished Ph.D.
dissertation, Haifa University School of Law) (on file with author).
12. See infra Part l.
13.

See CHARI, HOGAN & MURPHY, supra note 1, at 3-4.

14.

See Stigler, supra note 2, at 11-13; see also Posner, supra note 7, at 347.
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these groups.' 5 This Article specifically addresses legislator-targeted
lobbying and its legislative regulation. 6
HI. POSSIBLE

EXPLANATIONS OF THE PARADOX

This Part presents five possible explanations that point at the
embedded advantages of regulated lobbying for both legislators and
lobbyists. 7 The first explanation refers to the legislators' interest in
regulating lobbying through legislation as an apparatus for exposing the
intensity of legislation seekers' preferences. 8 The second explanation
pertains to the lobbyists' interest in lowering the costs associated with
obtaining essential information before deciding whether they should
lobby for an issue. 9 The third explanation relates to the legislators'
interest in improving the reliability of information provided by
lobbyists.2" The fourth explanation has to do with legislators' interest in
2
lowering the costs associated with obtaining essential information. ' And
the fifth explanation addresses the lobbyists' interests in lowering the
legislators' extortionist powers against them.22
based on several general assumptions as
These explanations are
23
presented in the literature:
24

(1) Lobbyists and legislators have limited resources.
(2) Legislators are mainly (but not necessarily exclusively) re-electionmotivated.25
(3) Legislators have no ascertained information as to which law or
policy would guarantee them broader public support. They

15. STEVEN CROLEY, Interest Groups and Public Choice, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON
PUBLIC CHOICE AND PUBLIC LAW 49, 72-78 (DANIEL A. FARBER & ANNE JOSEPH O'CONNELL
eds., 2010).
16. See infra Part Hl.
17. See infra Part 1.
18. See infra Part11.A.
19. See infra Part HL.B.
20. See infra Part II.C.
21. See infra PartffI.D.
22. See infra Part I.E.
23. David Austen-Smith & John R. Wright, Competitive Lobbying for Legislators'
Votes, 9 SOC. CHOICE & WELFARE 229, 230-33 (1992).
24. Hall & Deardorff, supra note 10, at 71-72.
25. Austen-Smith & Wright, supra note 23, at 231. The term "re-election" refers to
situations in which legislators vote for the most popular laws that the majority of voters desire.
When legislators must choose between two bills, they invest in the one they perceive as electorally
lucrative. In many cases, bills are relevant to given minorities, but even in such cases legislators
vote according to the electoral popularity of one minority. See DAVID R. MAYHEW, CONGRESS:
THE ELECTORAL CONNECTION 13 (1974); Warren E. Miller & Donald E. Stokes, Constituency
Influence in Congress, 57 AM. POL. Sci. REV. 45, 45-46 (1963).
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have preconceptions 26on issues, but those may change given
additional information.
(4) Interest groups generally seek to narrowly influence legislators'
votes on a certain agenda, as opposed to the broad influence of some
general philosophy.
27
(5) Lobbyists often process information that legislators do not.
(6) Lobbyist-provided information influences legislators only if they
have not possessed it in the first place.
(7) Lobbyist-provided information is significant only if its reliability is
proven. The fact that some group chooses to purchase it is indicative of
the information's veracity. Asymmetry between lobbyist and legislator
exists only if information comes with a price; otherwise, the legislator
would know it fully.
(8) If they so choose, legislators may investigate and verify the
information that lobbyists give them, but they have no incentive to do
so. Generally, they would rather not invest the required resources nor
procure the same information indirectly and at lower costs, but the fact
that they can do that influences the lobbyists' behavior.
(9) Legislators are generally lobbied by 28
a single group, or by two
groups with conflicting agendas and views.
Potential explanations
above assumptions.29

are presented

against the backdrop of the

A. FirstExplanation:Legislators' Interest-An Apparatus that Exposes
the Preference Intensity of Legislation Seekers
The regulation of lobbyists practically creates an apparatus that
exposes the intensity of legislation-seekers' preferences. Given that
legislators have limited resources and are rational players who wish to
maximize their gains, such an apparatus could be important and
significant for them.3"
Lobbying is an important part of the interest-groups model since it
is the channel through which those groups convey their demands to the
legislators. In that model, legislation is a commodity that legislators
exchange for benefits that promote their re-election. Because their

26. Austen-Smith & Wright, supra note 23 passim.
27. Some maintain that lobbying is a two-stage process. Id. at 231. In the first stage, specific
information is gathered and studied, while in the second stage, lobbyists and legislators engage in
strategic communication based on that information. Id.
28. Id. at 232-33, 236-45.
29. See supra Part H.
30. That explanation appears in the literature. See, e.g., Margaret F. Brinig, Randall G.
Holcombe & Linda Schwartzstein, The Regulation of Lobbyists, 77 PUB. CHOICE 377 passim
(1993).
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resources are generally limited, legislators must, among other things,
classify and sort through the interest groups' requests they receive.
Being rational players, legislators aspire to maximize their profits from
the product they are selling while improving their chances of being so
rewarded.31 Thus, they need ways to classify the offers they receive by
the scope of their benefits from them. Regulation could serve as a tool
that helps legislators identify legislation-seeking actors whose demands
are strongest.3 2 Regulation could help legislators establish entry barriers
that push up the price of the process, thus eliminating players with less
intensive preferences. Regulation, therefore, raises the price of the
process and introduces barriers while presenting legislators with
information on lobbying groups that had managed to organize and pay
the price of regulated lobbying. Furthermore, it is reasonable to assume
that lobbyists who cross those barriers and can pay entry fees will also
deliver the goods. Regulated lobbying that includes registration,
disclosure, and reporting duties imposes costs on lobbyists and creates
barriers. According to Franklin Fischer, "[a] barrier to entry is anything
that prevents entry when entry is socially beneficial." 33
Following such regulation might be expensive and thus its presence
could separate between legislation seekers in terms of the strength of
their demands. Such a sorting mechanism can help legislators appreciate
the strengths of legislation demands by various groups, which can help
them reach a more correct decision (i.e., a decision that brings legislators
closer to their goals) and lower the chances of them making wrong
choices and investing in legislation that does not promote or underpromote their goals. According to the public choice theory, legislators
wish to maximize their personal power, but even if we accept the
Brennan and Hamlin34 assumption that legislators wish to promote issues
that they perceive as serving the public good if that serves their reelection, that explanation remains valid.35
Regulating lobbying, therefore, helps identifying lobbyists who
may undertake the exchange of goods that is the foundation of the
economic theory of legislation because through such regulation,
legislators can select the groups that are willing to pay more for

31. Austen-Smith & Wright, supra note 23, at 233, 236-37.
32. Brinig, Holcombe & Schwartzstein, supranote 30, at 380-81.
33. Franklin M. Fisher, Diagnosing Monopoly, 19 Q. REV. ECO. & Bus. 7 (1979),
reprinted in 27 J. REPRINTS ANTITRUST L. & ECO. 671, 687 (1997).
34. GEOFFREY BERNNAN & ALAN HAMLIN, DEMOCRATIC DEVICES AND DESIRES
(Cambridge Univ. Press, 2000); Abner J. Mikva, Foreword, 74 VA. L. REV. 167, 167-69
(1988).
35. See generally BERNNAN & HAMLIN, supranote 34; Mikva, supra note 34.
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legislation.3 6 Lobbyists who are willing to pay prices as quoted in the
regulation instructions signal to legislators that the benefit they give
them are worth at least the price of lobbying. Hence, the regulation of
lobbying can help legislators sort legislation requests and identify those
that serve them best politically.
Regulation also creates an entry barrier that makes lobbying
more expensive and increases the value of preserving the lobbyists'
reputation.3 7 Having invested in getting through that barrier,
lobbyists' reputation is worth more, as might be losing it, which
improves the chances that legislators would subsequently be paid by the
interest group.3 8
Regulation improves the legislators' ability to identify the strong
preferences of legislation seekers while making legislation more
expensive. According to the model suggested in the literature,39 the
regulation of lobbying should only minimally impact the scope of
suggested legislation because the costs of bills are relatively low.40 At
the same time, such regulation should decrease the relative part of bills
that actually become laws because legislation promotion becomes
expensive. The regulation of lobbying practices should help legislators
more effectively identify lucrative bills (whose promotion yields more),
focus on those, and avoid investing in and promoting less lucrative bills.
Hence, the expectation is that fewer bills would turn into laws. This,
in turn, is expected to raise the price of legislation and allow legislators
to collect higher rents for the efforts they make on behalf of
interest groups.
The creation of entry barriers is no simple matter and requires great
attention. Too low barriers would not produce the desired filters, while
barriers that are too high might over-filter bills, which might make
legislators lose the benefits they may entail.
Very few empirical studies addressed the practical impact of
lobbying regulation on the number of lobbyists registered as active.41
Even fewer studies attempted to tie these data with the argument made in
this Article that regulation creates entry barriers that help legislators
study the lobbyists' intensity of preference. A relevant empirical study
by Brinig, Holcombe, and Schwartzstein ("BHS") examined the quantity

36.
37.
38.
39.

Brinig, Holcombe & Schwartzstein, supra note 30.
Id.
Id. at 378.
Id.

40.

Id.

41. Kennith G. Hunter, Laura Ann Wilson & Gregory G. Brunk, Societal Complexity and
Interest-GroupLobbying in the American States, 53 J. POL. SOo. 488 passim (1991).
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of bills against the number of actual laws introduced in the U.S. 42 They
wished to establish that the regulation of lobbying creates entry barriers
by removing low-intensity preference groups from the arena, as a result
of which legislators have to respond to fewer but more qualitative (in
preference-intensity terms) appeals, which yields higher rents for
legislators. 43 BHS argued that regulation can lower the rate of bills that
become laws.' In a critical study, Lowery and Gray45 questioned the
BHS study and maintain that the regulation of lobbying actually creates
minimal and insignificant barriers, and that legislators have other ways
to verify the preference intensity of various groups. 46 Their study, they
said, shows that legislators are not aware of preference intensity and that
lobbyists are not sensitive to all lobbying costs. 47 They argue that
regulation only marginally impacts on the number of lobbyists who
register as such, and suggests that the findings of the BHS study are
rather weak.48
In summary, according to this explanation, regulation (1) allows
legislators to identify the intensity preferences of legislation seekers, (2)
increases the probability of receiving actual benefits for providing the
product that improves the reputation of interest groups, and (3) renders
49
the product more expensive by reducing supply.
B. Second Explanation:
Lobbyists'Interest in Lowering the Costs of Information
According to this explanation, regulation lowers the costs of
information obtained by lobbyists before they decide whether they
should lobby or ignore legislators who support the stance of their interest
group ex-ante. This argument is based on a model developed by David
Austen-Smith and John R. Wright5' whereby lobbyists decide to lobby a
friendly legislator who supports them ex-ante only if that legislator is
lobbied by another interest group that attempts to alter her view. This is
known as counteractive lobbying.5 1 In this explanation, it is argued that
42. Brinig, Holcombe & Schwartzstein, supra note 30, at 380-82.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. David Lowery & Virginia Gray, How Some Rules Just Don't Matter: The Regulation
of Lobbyists, 91 PUB. CHOICE 139 (1997).
46. Id. passim.
47. Id. at 145.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. David Austen-Smith & John R. Wright, CounteractiveLobbying, 38 AM. J. POL. SCI.
25 (1994); see also Austen-Smith & Wright, supra note 23.
51. Austen-Smith & Wright, supranote 50, at 29-31.
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regulation serves lobbyists by lowering the costs of information that
leads to the decision of whether or not to exercise counteractive
lobbying, the basic assumption being that the costs of obtaining such
information independently, without regulation, are higher than the costs
imposed on lobbyists when regulation imposes the disclosure duty
on them.5 2
In principle, interest groups may lobby three types of legislators:
(1) Friendly Legislators whose ex-ante stance corresponds with
the group's;
(2) Unfriendly Legislators whose ex-ante stance conflicts with the
group's; and
(3) Uncommitted Legislators who have not yet formed a stance on the
group's issues.
According to Austen-Smith and Wright's theory and empirical findings,
interest groups lobby all three types of legislators.5 3 Lobbying
uncommitted or unfriendly legislators can be explained intuitively:
Interest groups wish to minimize the number of legislators who oppose
the policy they promote and make more people support it. These groups,
therefore, engage in lobbying efforts to convince undecided legislators to
side with them and convince unfriendly legislators to change their
minds. Lobbying friendly legislators who share the groups' views,
however, is less intuitive to explain. Austen-Smith and Wright maintain
that interest groups lobby friendly legislators when they wish to thwart
advocacy efforts by opposing groups and to keep those legislators on
their side, so to speak.54 Thus, when lobbyists approach unfriendly
legislators, they do so regardless of whether or not an opposing group
makes similar efforts, but when they choose to lobby friendly legislators,
that choice follows their opposition's moves.
Based on that model and conclusions, it may be argued that
information about the existence and lobbying activities of opposing
groups is essential for their decision on whether or not to engage in
counteractive lobbying." This argument may lead to a conclusion that
regulation that imposes the disclosure of information duty on such
efforts actually benefits lobbyists.56
Thus, Austen-Smith and Wright maintain that the counteractive
52. Id. at 25-43.
53. Id. at 25-26.
54. Id. at 29.
55. Id.
56. This is true only if the costs of disclosure and reporting, as imposed by legislation, are
lower than the costs of espionage designed to uncover such essential information about the opposing
lobbying group. Id.
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lobbying concept is intuitive and self-evident when groups lobby
friendly legislators, attempting to thwart the lobbying efforts of
competing groups. 7 They made three hypotheses and proved them with
data they had collected on lobbying efforts that various organizations
made regarding Robert Bork's nomination for Associate Justice on the
U.S. Supreme Court in 1987.58
To present the hypotheses, they created a model of lobbying as a
strategic procedure of information transfer between two groups (Ga and
Gb) with opposing views (a and b, respectively) and a legislator (L), in
which both groups offer L information about their stances. Suppose L is
undecided and wants to make the correct decision, when "correct" for L
means a decision that gains voters' support and improves L's re-election
chances (or harm these chances as little as possible). Groups procure
information about voters' preferences. Should a given group find that
voters' side with its stance, it would certainly wish to accentuate that
fact when communicating with L directly. If the procured information
reveals the opposite, groups would not wish to convey that information
easily, and might even provide L with partial or misleading data.
Legislator L expects the groups' efforts to help her or her make the
correct decision, as specified above. Of course, L may gather such
information on her 9 own, but that might be expensive and L would
rather conserve resources for other ends. Still, though legislators want
lobbyists to do it for them, even if that means they might make a
decision that is "incorrect" for them, they do expect the information to
be reliable and thus may verify it occasionally and, if they find that
groups misled them, they might punish them (by, for example, denying
their access). 6"
In the first hypothesis, the group that opposes the legislator's stance
ex-ante is the one that makes the lobbying efforts.6 1 This is understood
rather intuitively: If L supports stance b and Ga does not engage in
counteractive lobbying, L's vote would clearly uphold the interests of
Gb. Since lobbying efforts are expensive, Gb would rather not make
them at all in this case.6 2 When not lobbied by either group, L votes
57. Id. at 29.
58. Id. at 35-42.
59. Here and hereinafter, pronouns refer to both genders.
60. See generallyAusten-Smith & Wright, supra note 50.
61. Id. at31-33.
62. Generally speaking, the more important an issue is for the legislator's supporters, the
harder it would be for interest groups to make that legislator vote against the interests of her
electorate. Id. Also, the more important an issue is for those groups, the more reliable the
information they give to the legislator would be, which increases the probability that the legislator
votes while fully informed. Id.
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according to the information at her disposal at the time, which happens
to serve Gb, in which case Gb avoids lobbying efforts. Hence, when
only one of two groups lobbies a legislator, it is the group that opposes
her views.
In the second hypothesis, a group's decision to lobby unfriendly
legislators is made independently of the advocacy efforts of other
groups. That is true under two conditions.63 The first has to do with the
legislators' preconceptions (P) and the assumption that they may be
altered. If L's P is strong to a point that makes the possibility that L
would switch sides from b to a unreasonable, no group would invest in
lobbying L.64 The second basic condition pertains to the cost (C) of
information procurement. If C is very high, no group would invest
resources in lobbying L either. In this case, L trusts the information
received from Ga and Gb without verifying it. Furthermore, L would
avoid such verification efforts if the cost of procuring information
proved very high. This, in turn, gives groups a strong incentive to twist
or misrepresent information they have. Yet, realizing that might be the
case, L may choose not to trust the information she is given, particularly
if it conflicts with L's original views (even if the groups present truthful
information). Thus, Ga's decision to make lobbying efforts depends on
these two parameters-L's P and C of information-and is made
independently of Gb.65
The third hypothesis asserts that when a friendly legislator is
lobbied by a group whose views conflict with her, the group that shares
her views may decide to lobby her, but their efforts would be purely
preemptive.6 6 The reason for that is the fact that Gb attempts to prevent
Ga from influencing L only if it is certain that the probability that Ga
could influence L is not low. Clearly, when voters obviously prefer
policy b over policy a, Ga's incentive to lobby is rather weak. Still, Ga
may try to lobby in such cases as well, but decide to present L with
misleading of partial information. In equilibrium cases, groups may
present the information they have and often present it precisely, but
sometimes it may provide misleading information to influence L's
stance. The legislators know that information provided by a given group
is correct in most cases and may often vote to promote its interests even
if that information conflicts with their initial preconceptions. Legislators
63. Id. at 33.
64. Id. at 32-33. Low P value indicates that L is convinced a priori that policy b is better than
policy a, and it is unlikely that any amount of lobbying would change L's mind. Id. Accordingly,
even Ga would find this situation not worth its lobbying efforts. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 33-34.
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who are told by Ga that voting for concept a is the right way to go may
try to sporadically verify the information they are given, which
motivates Ga to present reliable data.
In the end, legislators make the "correct" choices in most cases, but
may occasionally err. Thus, in an equilibrium, the odds that Ga could
mislead L are positive, and these are the cases that make Gb engage in
lobbying efforts. Yet, Gb's decision does depend on Ga's choice.
Following on the first hypothesis, only Ga has good reason to try and
change L's vote. Thus, Gb's only incentive for investing costly
information and making lobbying efforts is the attempt to thwart Ga's
efforts. Hence, Gb is actually lobbying against Ga more than it promotes
policy b as such.67
It should be stated that Gb would lobby in an attempt to thwart the
advocacy efforts of Ga only if it feels that chances are high that Ga could
change L's stance. That probability is high when voters prefer policy a
over policy b, which improves Ga's chances of influencing L, which
motivates Gb to engage in counteractive lobbying.
These hypotheses, as noted, were tested with collected data
regarding the lobbying efforts of organized groups that were involved in
Robert Bork's nomination for Associate Justice on the U.S. Supreme
Court in 1987.68 The data was collected through direct emailing and
personal interviews held from 1989-1990,69 and were later placed in a
formal model that corroborated them.7 °
Pointing at the co-dependency between actually lobbying and the
decision to do so reflects a need to receive information on existing
lobbying efforts. Regulation that forces the lobbying party to reveal its
activities makes Gb's "self-discovery" redundant, which lowers the costs
of revealing that piece of information.
Hence, if Gb's expenses comprise the costs of collecting data on
voter preferences and on the activities of Ga, legislation that imposes a
duty to disclose groups' activities (Is it lobbying? Which issue? Who is
lobbied?) spares Gb of the need to gather that data at its own cost.
According to the Austen-Smith and Wright model, the cost may be
substantially low in cases of counteractive lobbying because, as evident
from the aforementioned hypotheses, Gb's decision on whether or not to

67. Id. at 35-42.
68. Gregory Caldeira & John R. Wright, Lobbying for Justice: Organized Interests
Before the Senate, 1916-90, Vox POP NEWSL. POL. ORGS. & PARTIES, Spring 1991, at 4, 4-5.
69. Austen-Smith & Wright, supra note 50, at 35.
70. Id. at 29-42.
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engage in counteractive lobbying depends on whether Ga is lobbying
or not.7 1
Lobbyists may support such regulation because it could help them
obtain the information they need without investing efforts and resources.
This is true for as long as the costs of self-disclosure duty imposed by
regulation are lower than the "costs of espionage" that groups need to
spend in order to reveal that information.
Before concluding the presentation of this argument, we should
note one basic assumption of the Austen-Smith and Wright model-that
lobbying has a real impact on legislators-which is not self-evident and
72
conflicts with views that the literature has presented for many years.
One of the conclusions that may be drawn from the Austen-Smith and
Wright model is that lobbying substantially impacts legislators'
resolutions. 73 This conflicts with a general concept that was dominant
between the 1960s and the 1990s, according to which that impact was
74
rather small, if at all, amounting at best to bolstering existing stances.
That concept is based on several approaches and explanations.
One of the key approaches to lobbying, ever since the early 1960s,
75
was known as Milbrath's Communication Approach. It argued that
interest groups have little impact on legislators or legislation results
because lobbying was mainly meant to bolster, not change legislators'
stances.7 6 It assumed that legislators have preconceptions due to which
they are selective about certain stimuli and indifferent to others.
Legislators, therefore, predetermine which communication channels are
open to them and which are not. That assertion imposes a given reality
on interest groups in which they may deliver their message only if a
communication channel is open to receive it. According to Milbrath,
interest groups create messages and choose means to deliver them in
ways that receivers would welcome them,77 which is why they do not
78
bother to communicate with legislators who oppose them.
Matthews 79 also maintained that lobbying efforts are for the most
80
part directed at legislators whose views are firm and solid. Zeigler
71.
72.
73.
74.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at 31-34.
at 27-28.
at 42-43.
at 42.

75. See generally LESTER M. MILBRATH, THE WASHINGTON LOBBYISTS (Chicago: Rand
McNally, 1963).
76. Id. passim.
77. Id. at 189.

78. Id. at217.
79.
80.

DONALD R. MATTHEWS, U.S. SENATORS AND THEIR WORLD (Random House, 1960).
HARMON ZEIGLER, INTEREST GROUPS IN AMERICAN SOCIETY (Prentice-Hall, 1964).
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argued that successful lobbying depends on the degree of legislators'
agreement with a group's stated views more than on its own powers of
manipulation and argument.8' Bauer, Pool, and Dexter82 explained the
tendency to "preach to the choir" with the human tendency to choose
easy targets: "It is so much easier to carry on activities within the circle
of those who agree and encourage you than it is to break out and find
potential proselytes, that the day-to-day routine and pressure of business
tend to shunt those more painful activities aside."83
Later, Dexter maintained that lobbying unfriendly or uncommitted
legislators not only makes no impact, but might really harm a cause. He
argued that lobbying efforts directed at legislators who oppose the
lobbying group's stances might motivate the legislator to argue against
the group and even rally additional supporters of her stance against the
lobbying group's cause.'
In 1963, Hayes 85 claimed that interest groups act as Bauer, Pool,
and Dexter described because interest groups must prove their relevance
to the public, and they do so by demonstrating that they have access to
the House.8 6 A group's visible access to legislators keeps its members in
and helps find new members. According to Hayes, keeping legislators
accessible is more important to a group than "winning" (e.g., changing
the stance of a given legislator), which is why groups will work on
improving their access powers and avoid creating antagonism against the
group because, as noted, antagonizing groups might lose their access
routes and subsequently lose the perks it involves (e.g., partaking
in committees' discussions). 87 According to this view, having access to
legislators is clear indication that a group is relevant and,
therefore, important.8 8
The bulk of explanations presented above maintains that lobbying
has little or incalculable impact and refers to the assumption that
legislators have their stances and lobbyists address them because of
those stances. It is further assumed that interest groups seek to avoid

81. That view was shared in LEWIS ANTHONY DEXTER, How ORGANIZATIONS ARE
REPRESENTED IN WASHINGTON 52-54 (Bobbs-Merrill, 1969).
82. RAYMOND A. BAUER, ITHIEL DE SOLA POOL & LEWIS A. DEXTER, AMERICAN
BUSINESS AND PUBLIC POLICY: THE POLITICS OF FOREIGN TRADE (Atherton Press, 1963).

83. Id. at 353.
84. BAUER, POOL & DEXTER, supra note 82, at 352-53; see also DEXTER, supra note 81, at
143-44.
85.

MICHAEL

T.

HAYES,

LOBBYISTS

& LEGISLATORS:

A THEORY

OF POLITICAL

MARKETS 18-25 (1981).
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id.at 86.
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89
confrontation (following Dexter's "easy target" argument) and thus
lobbying is actually unilateral: legislators are lobbied by groups that
agree with them, not by rival groups.
According to Austen-Smith and Wright, these conclusions leave the
key question unanswered: Why should anyone even bother lobbying?
Similarly, if lobbying impact on legislators is negligible and if groups
rarely make an impact, why is the number of interest groups constantly
on the rise? 9°
Austen-Smith and Wright offered an alternative interpretation of
91
that view which, they believe, answers the above questions. According
to them, organizations lobby both friendly and unfriendly legislators
move. 92
where lobbying the former is both a strategic and preventive
Assuming there are interest groups on both sides, the Austen-Smith and
Wright theory expects only one group to pre-intend to invest resources
in lobbying-the one that legislators would vote against in the absence
of lobbying. 93 That group makes lobbying efforts, attempting to
convince legislators to change their stances and-in an equilibrium, on
average-legislators are convinced. In any case, groups whose views are
upheld by legislators to begin with have no incentive to make lobbying
efforts, unless the opposite group makes such efforts. Since lobbying is
expensive, if the opposing group makes no lobbying efforts, legislators
will anyway vote according to their original stances. In such cases, it is
clear that the group whose views legislators support without lobbying
lacks the incentive to lobby.
As a result, if two groups should choose to lobby the same
legislator, the theory expects the opposing lobbying group to exclusively
engage in prevention-i.e., in providing information aimed at balancing
out the potential impact of the other group on the legislator's stance.
Furthermore, according to the Austen-Smith and Wright theory,
counteractive lobbying improves the reliability of both groups, and thus
legislators are not forced to verify arguments because such a situation
94
provides them with more reliable information.
This argument is weak because disclosure is bilateral. This model
lowers the cost of obtaining information about other lobbyists and their
activities, but at the same time it makes them expose information about
their own activities. Disclosure-imposing apparatuses can serve lobbyists

89.

BAUER, POOL & DEXTER, supranote 82, at 353.

90.
91.
92.
93.
94.

Austen-Smith & Wright, supra note 23.
Id.
Id. at 245-46.
Id.
Id.
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only if the cost of espionage and information gathering exceeds the
(direct and indirect) costs of self-disclosure. It may further be argued
that lobbyists with sufficient resources to independently obtain
information would rather avoid such apparatuses, which deprive them of
their relative edge. Also, lobbyists with sufficient resources areaccording to the public-choice approach-the stronger lobbyists, those
who can influence decision-makers. If their impact on the process is
crucial and they have no interest in promoting mechanisms that harm
their relative edge, one may make arguments against the validity of
this explanation.
In summary: Given this characteristic, information about a lobbying
group is essential for any group that engages in counteractive lobbying.
Regulation that exposes Ga's decision to lobby saves Gb's espionage
expenses and helps it decide whether or not to lobby without
these expenses.9 5
C. Third Explanation:Legislators 'InterestIncreasingthe Credibilityof ObtainedInformation
This explanation argues that legislation that imposes disclosure
duties on lobbyists and threatens to punish them for noncompliance with
these duties could encourage lobbyists to avoid making false reports,
which largely spares legislators of the need to verify information that
lobbyists provide.
As noted, legislators invest in the procurement of information, but
profit when they increase their re-election chances.9 6 In this exchange,
they can always choose between collecting the data themselves and
having lobbyists help them obtain the data they need before they make a
decision that best serves them. Information gathering has its cost; which
is why (from the legislators' point of view) lobbyists offer the effective
option of obtaining information without paying for it directly. Yet, the
indirect procurement of information from lobbyists might potentially
collect a toll in terms of information reliability: lobbyist-provided
information might be unreliable or even misleading.
One way of increasing the reliability of such information is
verifying it. If legislators always verified information, lobbyists would
always be reliable; but constant verification entails high expenses on the
legislators' part, and legislators would rather avoid that. In equilibrium
cases, a delicate balance exists between the legislators' trust and
95. See supra Part HI.B.
96. Eric Rasmusen, Lobbying When the Decisionmaker Can Acquire Independent
Information, 77 PUB. CHOICE 899, 899 (1993).
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lobbyists' reliability in which lobbyists never know for certain whether
legislators trust the information they had sold them, while legislators are
97
never certain that they can trust the lobbyists. In addition to the selfverification of information as a direct means of establishing reliability, it
may be argued that the regulation of lobbying might serve the same end
and lower the lobbyists' incentive to provide misleading and false
information. The regulation of lobbying that includes transparency and
disclosure duties, and sanctions if violated, could motivate lobbyists to
avoid false reports because they need to protect their reputation-an
expensive commodity-in several ways.
First, if regulation bans false or misleading reports and names
sanctions if the bans are violated, it is a direct incentive. Harm to the
reputation of lobbyists who violate such regulation is immediate and
anchored in a law. In Lithuania, for example, the law states that lobbying
is illegal when, among other things, lobbyists deliberately mislead an
elected official or civil servant by citing misleading facts or
circumstances while attempting to promote, amend, or nullify
legislation.9" Such regulation directly encourages lobbyists to avoid
false reports.
Comparative law, however, reveals that similar regulation in most
countries does not address bans on false or misleading reporting and
mainly discusses registration duties and the need to disclose information
such as the lobbyists' names, the names of the group or individual they
99
serve, the lobbied issue, and the identity of the lobbied legislator. It
may be argued that such regulation does not directly encourage lobbyists
to file reliable reports, but one cannot argue that it offers indirect
incentives to doing so. When regulation does not directly address the
reliability of reported information-which is the majority of cases-the
explanation of the existence of an incentive for avoiding unreliable
information is rather more complicated. Suppose that as part of her
efforts, a lobbyist provides a legislator with false information and that
the latter uses that information to make legislative moves while
extending that information to other legislators. In such cases, there is a
good chance that the falsehood of that information will be revealed
whether or not regulation exists. Yet, when this area is regulated so as to
require the disclosure of the identity of the lobbyist, her senders, and the
lobbied party and issue, the costs of disclosing the identity of the
lobbyist (and her connection with the lobbied party and issue) are far
97. Id. at 912.
98. For a review of the Lithuanian law, see CHARI, HOGAN & MURPHY, supra note 1, at
71-76; Naveh, supra note 11, at 65-70.
99. Naveh, supra note 11, at 11-81.
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lower than if the area were unregulated. The source of the false
information is also revealed at low cost and thus regulation of this kind
increases the chance it would harm the reputation of the lobbyists and
their senders. That kind of regulation, therefore, could motivate lobbyists
to avoid risking providing unreliable information.
Another possible explanation of the association between regulation
that requires registration and disclosure (even if not directly addressing
information reliability) and the lower costs of information could rely on
Austen-Smith and Wright model, presented as part of the second
explanation above."° According to that explanation, the reliability of
information presented to legislators is higher when the said legislators
are simultaneously lobbied by two groups with conflicting stances. In
that model, a group's decision to lobby unfriendly legislators is
independent of whether another group lobbies them or not, but the
decision to lobby friendly legislators does follow from the moves of the
opposite lobbying group. 10 1 The information about the activity of the
group whose stance conflicts with the legislator's (before lobbying) is
essential for the group with which she sides. Legislation that mandates
disclosure and reporting reveals that essential piece of information to the
group that sides with the legislator without or at low costs. Thus, such
legislation might potentially increase the number of cases in which
legislators are lobbied by both groups.
To establish this argument, two points need to be explained: One
pertains to the very statement that the reliability of information increases
when the legislator is lobbied by two opposing groups; the other pertains
to the underlying assumption that the decision on whether or not to
lobby a legislator depends (partly or fully) on knowing that another
group is already doing that.
Referring to the first point, studies have shown that legislators are
more informed on their voters' preferences when they are lobbied (even
if by one group) than when they are not, and they vote more "correctly"
when lobbied."°2 This is even more true when legislators are lobbied by
two opposing groups since that improves the legislators' chances of
obtaining full information,103 potentially increasing the number of their
"correct" votes.
As for the second point, the assumption that the decision on
whether or not to lobby a given legislator depends (partly or fully) on
100. See supraPart IM.B.
101. Austen-Smith & Wright, supra note 50, at 33-34.
102. Austen-Smith & Wright, supra note 23, at 245-46.
103. Austen-Smith & Wright, supra note 50, at 34; Austen-Smith & Wright, supra note 23,
at 245-46.
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knowing that another group is already doing that is based on the AustenSmith and Wright model (extensively discussed above)."0 The argument
here is highly intuitive: when one group lobbies a legislator, the two
maintain conflicting views. The opposite group has nothing to gain from
trying to convince that legislator who supports its stance and will vote in
its favor, even in the absence of counteractive lobbying. As noted, the
latter group would be motivated to lobby that legislator only if the other
group does that; hence the decision to lobby is independent of whether
the opposing group makes lobbying efforts. 105 As may be recalled,
lobbying carried out in reaction to lobbying by another group whose
stances conflict with the legislator's is known as counteractive lobbying.
Regulation that imposes disclosure and reporting duties signals to
friendly lobbyists that the legislator is being lobbied by the opposite
group and might subsequently change her stance. Such information,
when obtained freely and thanks to legislation, improves access to
information, which increases the probability of bilateral lobbying, which
improves the reliability of the information provided and lowers the
legislator's chances of making an "incorrect" decision. In such cases,
legislators will turn to lobbyists to help her make a "correct" decision.
Simultaneous lobbying by the two parties is expected to make legislators
decisions come closer to the stances of constituents.
Furthermore, as noted in the first explanation above, the barrier that
obstructs entry into the lobbying market, which the regulation created,
improves the lobbyists reputation, which is a greater incentive for
protecting it. 106 The cost of regulation increases the cost of the lobbying
process and, therefore, increases the value of lobbyists' reputation
as well.
According to this argument legislators can therefore benefit from
regulation that includes incentives for lobbyists who maintain their
reputation by, for example, creating a direct incentive (punishing for
false reports) or an indirect one (raising the cost of lobbying). Such
regulation should motivate lobbyists to offer reliable information since
they feel their reputation might suffer otherwise. On the other hand,
making lobbying too costly might significantly impair the resources that
lobbyists allocate for obtaining information, and a group's motivation to
lobby-which is undesirable for legislators. Finding the balance between
the incentive and the right price of lobbying or obtaining information is
no simple matter. It seems that it is no accident that Lithuania is the only

104. See Austen-Smith & Wright, supra note 50, at 34; see also supra Part HIB.
105. Austen-Smith & Wright, supra note 50, at 34.
106. See supra Part HIA.
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and that such regulation is
country that directly punishes for false1 reports
7
1
countries.
other
by
accepted
not easily
In summary, legislation will not guarantee that lobbyists abstain
from making false reports, but might make providing false or even
partial information less lucrative, which should increase the probability
of reliable reporting. In light of the assumptions presented earlier-that
legislators' resources are limited and, though they could verify the
information they receive on their own, they avoid that or do it at low
costs, using those who had processed the information-it would seem
that legislation could serve as an effective enforcement tool that instructs
lobbyists' conduct. Thus, the entry barrier that regulation could create
increases the value of lobbyists' reputation which, in itself, could
support the necessity of regulation.
D. Fourth Explanation:
Lowering Costs Associated with Legislators' Work
This explanation states that the regulation of lobbying could lower
the costs associated with legislative work, including the obtainment of
information that could motivate legislators to promote legislation that
regulates lobbying and serves them. This explanation may be established
on a model developed by Richard Hall and Alan V. Deardorff."' s Unlike
ordinary models that view lobbying as an exchange trade (procurement
of electorate) 10 9 or a convincing practice (informative signaling), 110 Hall
107. CHARi, HOGAN & MURPHY, supra note 1, at 71-76.
108. Hall& Deardorff, supra note 10, at 71.
109. When lobbying is viewed as a barter deal, the key element is the mutual benefits that
result from the interaction between lobbyists and political entities. According to that view, which is
the foundation of the interest groups theory, interest groups are opportunistic and rational rentseekers. The basic assumption of models that are common in political science and economy is that
representatives of interest groups and legislators are busy seeking mutually beneficial deals; interest
groups want to promote their interests by introducing or preventing legislation, while legislators
generally seek campaign funds. Interest groups' agents are instructed to execute barter deals, but
money-not information or lobbyists' arguments-is the relevant changeable that instructs
behavior. For more on the issue see generally David Austen-Smith, Interest Groups: Money,
Information and Influence, in PERSPECTIVE ON PUBLIC CHOICE 296 (Dennis Mueller, ed.,
Cambridge Univ. Press, 1996); Rebecca Morton & Charles Cameron, Elections and The
Theory of Campaign Contributions:A Survey and CriticalAnalysis, 4 ECO. & POL. 79 (1992).
110. Papers published after "lobbying" was defined as exchange trade or barter deals argue that
lobbying is actually a strategy of convincing others. Lobbyists have information that legislators
desire. The strategic transfer of that information is in the heart of their relationship. This approach
relies on a basic assumption according to which, the distribution of information between lobbyists
and legislators is asymmetrical. The latter are guided by their need to be reelected and thus wish to
make the "correct" decisions to attain that goal. To do so, legislators wish to vote "correctly"namely, promote stances that their constituents support. Lobbyists, at the same time, hold relevant
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and Deardorff say lobbying is a form of strategic subsidy and works for
legislators when, in fact, lobbying is not meant to change the minds of
unfriendly legislators, but to help friendly ones promote their goals."'1
According to their model, lobbying lowers the costs associated with
working and gathering data and intelligence for legislators who were
strategically chosen by lobbyists to pursue those ends. 1 2 The model
focuses on the limited budgets of legislators, which becomes less limited
through lobbyist work that helps them attain more. Thus, while literature
that deals with signaling1 3 focused on lobbyists as providers of
information and exchange theories focused on trading' 14 in preferences,
the Hall and Deardorff model mainly addressed the legislators' budget
line and presented lobbying as a form of office services that lobbyists
offer to legislators.115
According to that model, lobbyists target friendly legislators
because they would rather allocate their resources to serving legislators
who are most likely to use them to promote the lobbyists' goals. 1 6 In
other words, interest groups procure expensive information that could
serve legislators and strategically distribute it to influential legislators
who can advance their interests.
Hall and Deardorff maintain that understanding lobbying as subsidy
resolves quite a few anomalies that other models ignored." 7 For
information that legislators do not have; hence lobbying is a mechanism through which information
is transferred to legislators. Legislators may obtain that information alone, which requires
investment on their part, but they have no real incentive to do that because their resources are
limited and because lobbyists are experts on the issue at hand. Yet, if legislators never checked the
information, lobbyists would not be motivated to be reliable and thus would not really impact the
legislators' moves. If they examined the information, lobbyists would always be reliable, but
legislators would not require their services; or their constant reliability would eliminate the
legislators' motivation to check them, and so on and so forth. An equilibrium is based on a delicate
balance between the legislators' trust and lobbyist reliability, so that the latter never know if the
information they provide is checked by legislators, who are never able to fully trust the lobbyists.
Thus, legislators sometimes check and verify information on their own, while lobbyists sometimes
offer partial or erroneous information. Eric Rasmusen, Lobbying When the Decisionmakers Can
Acquire IndependentInformation, 77 PUB. CHOICE 899, 910-12 (1993).
111. Hall & Deardorff, supra note 10, at 69, 72.
112. Id. at69.
113. JOHN MARK HANSEN, GAINING ACCESS: CONGRESS AND THE FARM LOBBY, 19191981, at 11-13 (1991); KAY SCHLOZMAN & JOHN TIERNEY, ORGANIZED INTERESTS IN
AMERICAN DEMOCRACY passim (New York: Harper and Row, 1986); Austen-Smith, supra
note 109, at 315-17.
114. See generally Arthur T. Denzau & Michael C. Munger, Legislators and Interest
Groups: How Unorganized Interests Get Represented, 80 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 89 (1986);
Richard L. Hall & Frank W. Wayman, Buying Time: Moneyed Interests and the Mobilization
of Bias in CongressionalCommittees, 84 AM. POL. SCi. REV. 797 (1990).
115. Hall & Deardorff, supra note 10, at 73-76.
116. Id.
117. Id. at72-76,78-80.
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example, it answers Milbrath who argued that legislators only heed
lobbyists who tell them what they want to hear and concluded that the
latter do not gain much.118 That failed to explain why lobbyists invest so
much and why there is constantly more of them. When lobbyist activity
is examined in subsidy terms, this is answered: Lobbyists invest in
lobbying because that makes legislators more accessible to them. That
accessibility is due to the fact that lobbyists can subsidize legislators'
information and labor costs. Lowering the price of the product (labor and
information) makes legislators more available and easier to influence.
The model is based on five assumptions, which are based on
"existing information" on the legislators.119 According to the first
assumption, for legislators to impact on policies they have to invest great
efforts in the legislation process. 120 The efforts can include attending
committee meetings, 121 filing bills or amendments, 122 creating or
breaking up coalitions, conducting negotiations, and convincing other
legislators to support their desired cause.123 In any event, the issue is the
ongoing efforts made ahead of a vote, not the act of voting itself.
According to the second assumption, as generally presented above,
legislators' resources-staff, time, information, and labor-are limited
and constantly lacking, which is why legislators cannot
address all the
12 4
required issues and make maximal progress in them.
The third assumption is that for every given term in office,
legislators care more about their general impact, not only in a specific
issue. Thus, legislators are interested in a variety of issues
25
simultaneously (often following their constituents' diversified issues). 1

118.

MILBRATH, supra note 75.

119. Hall & Deardorff, supra note 10, at 72-76. Some of these assumptions are mentioned as
basic in the beginning of the chapter that explains the paradox.
120. RICHARD L. HALL, PARTICIPATION IN CONGRESS 6-7, 25-27 (Yale Univ. Press,
1996); GREGORY WAWRO, LEGISLATIVE ENTREPRENEURSHIP IN THE U.S. HOUSE OF

REPRESENTATIVES 25-44 (Univ. of Michigan Press, 2000); Lawrence C. Evans, Influence in
Congressional Committees, in CONGRESSIONAL POLITICS

155,

156-58

(Christopher

C.

Deering, ed., Chicago, 1989).
121. RICHARD F. FENNO, CONGRESSMEN IN COMMITTEES 1 (1973); KENNETH A.
SHEEPSLE, THE GIANT JIGSAW PUZZLE: COMMITTEE ASSIGNMENTS IN THE MODERN HOUSE

35-62 (Univ. of Chicago Press, 1978).
122.

BARBARA SINCLAIR, THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE U.S. SENATE 180-84 (Johns

Hopkins Univ. Press, 1989).
123. R. DOUGLAS ARNOLD, THE LOGIC OF CONGRESSIONAL ACTION 88-89, 115-16 (Yale
Press, 1990); GARY W. COX & MATHEW D. MCCUBBINS, LEGISLATIVE LEVIATHAN: PARTY

GOVERNMENT IN THE HOUSE 115-56, 256 (Univ. of California Press, 1993).
124. Hall & Deardorff, supranote 10, at 72.
125.

Evans, supra note 120.
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According to the fourth assumption, legislators prioritize issues
they wish to promote, 126 but choosing those issues also requires
resources such as consulting stakeholders, studying the direction and
power of constituents' preferences, and so on. Legislators' preferences
are reflected in that model through the level of their readiness to move
ahead on one rather than on other issues (i.e., resources that legislators
invest in issue X are detracted from resources they could invest in
issue Y).
According to the fifth assumption, when compared with legislators,
lobbyists are experts. 127 Legislators care about a variety of issues all at
the same time, while lobbyists focus on relatively few issues in which
they have more time, experience, and expertise than legislators.
Based on these five assumptions, the key components of the theory
are presented within the framework of a relatively simple
microeconomic system where, as noted above, lobbyists can impact on
the legislators' budget lines, not on the parameters that comprise their
benefit function. Thus, if a legislator L needs to address issues A, B, and
C, group G that wishes to promote issue A (by filing a bill, for example)
collects all the information needed for writing that bill, drafts the bill for
L, and helps her promote A while allocating fewer resources than L
would have been required to invest otherwise. 128 At the same time,
legislators may make use of lobbyists' resources to promote issues they
have not prioritized because they need resources for independent studies
of issues they care about and wish to directly invest their resources in
them to avoid making erroneous decisions on these matters.
So far, we explained why legislators are interested in lobbying, but
how can legislation that speaks of disclosure and transparency duties
help legislators subsidize their resources? To answer that we need to
consider a few additional points that arise from the model and are
described as potential projections or hypotheses. The first point,
mentioned above, pertains to lobbyists who lobby their allies (legislators
whose stance corresponds with the group's) since they use the resources
for work that promotes their goal, not against it. 129 According to the
second point, lobbyists lobby their stronger allies harder, when "strong"
126. RICHARD L. HALL, PARTICIPATION IN CONGRESS 55-56 (Yale Univ. Press, 1996);
WAWRO, supra note 120, at 45-48.
127. KEvN M. ESTERLING, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF EXPERTISE: INFORMATION AND
EFFICIENCY IN AMERICAN NATIONAL POLITICS 44-45 (Univ. of Michigan Press, 2004).
128. It may be argued that a group that promotes issue A helps legislators allocate resources to
promote issues B and C that may have not been promoted otherwise. In other words, subsidies
offered by one group free legislator resources for dealing with issues that might have been neglected
otherwise.
129. See supra Part HI.D.
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speaks of the marginal desire of the legislators to pay for advancing
toward the policy they share with the group. In this point, lobbyists
invest in the most yielding issues. According to the third hypothesis
attributed to this model, stronger lobbying efforts make allies invest
more efforts in promoting the issue. Another point pertains to interest
groups that promote public, not private issues: being lobbied by groups
that have no resources to offer legislators or help their re-election can
increase their allies' efforts and participation. According to Berry, such
groups believe they have an edge over legislators, in terms of research
and information attainment, mainly thanks to their reputation as
providers of reliable and precise information. 3 ' More often than not,
these groups initiate researches on their own accords, and it is reasonable
to assume that the media would cover their reports more than they do
with information provided by corporations, trade unions, or financial
players."3 Furthermore, public-interest groups may not have actual
resources to pay legislators, but they have the power to collect prices
from legislators by exposing information about their conduct, which
might harm their re-election chances. These groups' self-portrayal as
reliable could help them deal with the public as well.
It may be argued that regulation that imposes transparency and the
exposure of lobbying-related data-such as lobbied issues and the
identities of the lobbying and lobbied parties-lowers legislators' costs
of obtaining specific information about their rivals and competitors,
which frees more resources for the lobbying stage. Thus, regulation
could help legislators receive larger subsidies because some of the
lobbyists' resources are channeled toward that end. This claim,
therefore, is true only if the costs of espionage are higher than the cost of
revealing information as required by regulation.
Subsidies may be enlarged in several additional ways. Based on the
aforementioned hypotheses-whereby lobbying makes other lobbyists
address legislators, and the former seek the strongest possible allieslegislators may use regulation as a tool that makes them appear as
worthy allies. As regulation exposes lobbyists' ties with them, they
could signal to other lobbyists that they are strong and cooperative allies
who promote laws. This, in turn, can make additional lobbyists reach
out to them, which could increase the labor and information subsidies
they receive.
130.

WILLIAM

P.

BROWNE,

CULTIVATING

CONGRESS:

CONSTITUENCIES,

ISSUES

AND

INTERESTS IN AGRICULTURAL POLICYMAKING 143 (Univ. of Kansas Press, 1995). See
generally JEFFREY M. BERRY, THE NEW LIBERALISM: THE RISING POWER OF CITIZEN GROUPS

(Brookings Press, 1999).
131. BERRY, supranote 130, at 120-42.
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E. Fifth Explanation:Lobbyists'InterestLowering Legislators'Extortion Abilities
The fifth explanation of the alleged paradox of regulating lobbying
through legislation focuses on minimizing the legislators' ability to
extort lobbyists. Fred McChesney developed a model that conflicts with
viewing politicians as mysterious and passive players, known as the
Rent Extraction Model.132 According to McChesney, politicians are not
mere "brokers" who distribute wealth in response to competing political
demands, but individual players who make demands and threats that
other players respond to.133 The view of politicians as rent seekers (of
votes, campaign donations, etc.) is lost in a model that portrays them as
passive players who serve as brokers, going between groups that demand
and compete for rent.134 McChesney maintains that politicians have
other ways than creating rent to profit: They may demand the votes of
constituents or money and in return offer the rents that create the
"welfare rectangle" of Stigler's original model, but they may also gain
by threatening to impose costs on private market parties (and then
eliminate the threat as part of a deal), which is a form of political
extortion.' 3 5
The McChesney concept detracts nothing from the traditional rentextraction model. In fact, it supports the traditional model and even
expands it by acknowledging the existence of alternative sources of
political gains.'3 6 Stigler's original paper refers to this aspect as reflected
in the state's inherent ability to threaten private rents. Stigler said:
The state-the machinery and power of the state-is a potential
resource or threat to every industry in the society. With its power to
prohibit or compel, to take or give money, the state can and does
selectively help or hurt a vast number of industries .... Regulation
may be actively sought by an industry, or it may be thrust upon it. 137
McChesney, therefore, stated that a political position grants a semiproprietary right not only to rents from legislation, but also to imposing
costs.' 38 Thus, politicians may gain by exercising their right to impose
legislative restrictions on private players. When a politician threatens to
132. FRED S. MCCHESNEY, MONEY FOR NOTHING: POLITICIANS, RENT EXTRACTION, AND
POLITICAL EXTORTION 20-42 (Harvard Univ. Press, 1997).
133. See id. at 26, 27, 29.
134. See id. at 37.
135. Fred S. McChesney, Rent Extraction and Rent Creation in the Economic Theory of
Regulation, 16 J. LEG. STUD. 101, 104 (1987).
136. See id.
137. See Stigler, supra note 2, at 3.
138. See McChesney, supra note 135, at 103-17.
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tax a certain industry, that industry is motivated to protect its capital and
is willing to pay the legislator sums that could equal the sum of money it
might lose if so taxed. Thus, legislators can profit from making threats or
exercising their right to impose costs on market players that might
slice rent from the capital they are making from or investing in
their industries.
McChesney's take on the rent-seeking process conflict is the
customary view. He maintains that because tables do turn, politicians are
motivated to stop being passive and actively extort benefits.' 39
According to the rent-extortion approach, legislators may initiate bills in
an attempt to extract benefits from organizations or the public that the
bill might harm and, when they receive those benefits, they withdraw
their bills.14 In fact, this is a form of threat that the threatened party is
willing to pay a certain price for its removal. In this model, politicians
are independent players with individual demands to which private
141
players respond.
Once a politician is perceived as an independent player under
regulation, her goal function can no longer be viewed as having a single
value. That politician will maximize the scope of her returns by
comparing the marginal value of returns from votes, donations, bribery,
and other personal-gain sources. These are positive functions not only of
personal benefits she gives away, but also of costs she agrees not to
impose. A strategy of avoidance costs could assume several forms. The
clearest form may be a decision to re-regulate an industry that had been
permitted to form a cartel or a monopoly. Should a politician decide now
to restrict or revoke that permit unexpectedly, the reaction to the loss of
wealth expected in the future would be immediate. The politician, who
was not party to the original agreement between that industry and the
government, would not be motivated to follow the rent-creating deal,
unless she is properly compensated. Thus, the very validity of the
original agreement may be used as a threat with which rent can be
extorted. Additional threats that could extort rent are threats to lower
prices 142 or increase costs, 143 for example. According to McChesney's
model, lax constitutional protection of rights in a small country could be
fertile ground for rent extortion.'44

139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.

See id. at 105.
See id. at 107-09.
Seeid. at 109-12.
For an economic analysis of price slicing in that case see id. at 112-15.
For an economic analysis of cost hikes see id at 115-17.
See id. at 109.
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The rent-extortion model may be grounds for two arguments why
regulation is good for lobbyists. First, disclosure and reporting duties
make the extortion of lobbyists by legislators rather difficult because
such extortion might be revealed to the public. Regulation that requires
information about agreements with legislators immediately exposes the
lobbied issue and the existence of communication between lobbyists and
legislators. The legislators know that with that information they might be
more easily exposed.
In a hypothetical situation, a legislator filed a bill suggesting to tax
a certain industry and explaining why, but then withdrew it. The
lobbyists' registrar, however, shows that a lobbyist for that industry had
lobbied the said legislator, attempting to encourage the latter to
withdraw the bill. That is then revealed to the public through the media
which, in this case, did not have to pay for that information. Such costfree exposure could force legislators into caution when dealing with
lobbyists. Yet, such regulation makes it hard for the lobbyists to bribe
legislators and for the same reason. Thus, if the lobbyist's cost of
extortion is higher than the benefit of bribing the legislator, it explains
why lobbyists may want regulation.
The second argument based on the rent-extortion model that could
explain why lobbyists may want regulation introduced says that
lobbyists, particularly those who represent strong organizations, fear
extortion. Attempting to detract from the legislators' ability to extort
them, lobbyists who work for competing organizations may join forces
and present legislators with a final product, a "legislation package" they
can live with, as a cartel. 45 In turn, legislators might react to such moves
with attempts to extort all the parties to that agreement by offering side
benefits to those who would break away from the partnership and desert
it. The disclosure duty might expose those benefits, and thus could
stabilize the agreement and guarantee its implementation. It is clear,
.therefore, that the legislated disclosure duty imposed on the parties
•weakens the legislators' ability to extort the parties when the latter are in
agreement, so legislation could serve as a tool that enforces agreements
between rival interest groups.
For the sake of this argument, we need to distinguish between
situations in which the lobbying parties' stances are in extreme
opposition and situations in which these stances are neither identical nor
absolutely contradictory. In the first case, the polarity of interests and
positions of the competing parties makes it less likely that the parties
would join forces and create a legislation package. This would make it a
145.

See generally id

https://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol47/iss2/9

28

Naveh: The Paradox of Regulating Lobbying through Legislation

2018]

THE PARADOX OFREGULATING LOBBYING THROUGHLEGISLATION

733

zero-sum game in which each party is motivated to lower the profits of
the opposition so as to maximize its own. For example, an anti-abortion
lobbyist loses if a bill permitting abortions is introduced and vice versa.
In situations where the interests and positions of the competing
parties are not contradictory or even absolutely the same (as in mixed
strategy games), the parties would seek a result that would maximally
benefit all the players without harming one. This situation could lend
itself to the formation of a cartel pertaining to the desired legislation.
Further clarification is required when the parties meet more than
once. There is a difference between one-time lobbying and situations in
which parties lobby against each other time and again. In that respect, it
is reminiscent of repeated games situations in which the same players
play against each other repeatedly many or an endless number of rounds;
or one game in which the parties engage each other in a single round.
The question of whether players engage in a single game or in
numerous and repeating games is relevant to the desertion issue. The
temptation to desert is greater in single game situations because deserters
could highly benefit from such a deviation in the short run. Such
situations facilitate legislators' efforts to extort a party to an agreement
and make it desert. Regulation that helps legislators expose deserters, as
stated above, might detract from the benefits that deserters gain because
exposure might harm their reputation, which in turn could impact on
their ability to make similar agreements with potential partners in the
future. Thus, in situations of repeating games in which all players know
146
they would be immediately punished for desertion in the next round,
146. This argument may be likened to a multiple-rounds prisoner's dilemma game in which the
parties play the same game over and over without a predetermined horizon (i.e., without naming one
round as last). Unlike in the original game where players play the game only once, here the parties
may decide to engage in strategic and egalitarian cooperation. In the original, single-round game,
players could benefit from cooperation too, but when there is equilibrium, both choose to desert.
Below is an example of a single-round prisoner's dilemma game (the figures denote years of
imprisonment-player 1 on the right):
Player 1

Confessed
Did not confess

Player 2
Confessed

Did not confess

3,3
0,5

5,0
1,1

The basic assumption in this game is that no party has the power to force the other to pledge not to
confess in advance. In this case, clearly both players would confess. If Player 2 does not, Player 1
believes she should confess because then she would be set free and not spend a year in prison. If
Player 2 confessed, Player I would rather confess too because that would slice her term from 5
years (if she does not confess) to 3 years. Thus from her point of view, Player 1 should always
confess. Player 2 would analyze the situation in the very same way and, as a result, both Players
confess and both serve 3 years, though if they cooperated and said nothing, they would spend only 1

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 2018

29

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 47, Iss. 2 [2018], Art. 9

HOFSTRA LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 47:705

that knowledge should stabilize the agreement to a certain extent, but
players in a single-round game lack that knowledge.
In summary, regulation that requires disclosure could help
legislators detract from lobbyists' ability to extort them. One argument
maintains that such regulation could more easily reveal the extortion to
the public and, assuming that legislators want to be reelected for office,
knowing that would diminish their motivation for extortion. Another
argument states that lobbyists may wish to join forces and present
legislators with agreed-upon legislation products. Reacting to such
coalitions, legislators might attempt to extort the parties to the agreement
by offering them side benefits if they deserted the agreement. The
disclosure duty might expose those side benefits and actually stabilize
and guarantee the agreement. Thus, the disclosure duties that apply to all
parties by law could weaken the legislators' ability to extort lobbyists
who are in agreement among themselves. It has been found, therefore,
that the regulation of lobbying could serve as a tool enforcing
agreements between rival interest groups.
IV. FINAL NOTES
This Article offered five theoretical explanations that point at
benefits that legislators and lobbyists could gain from legislation that
regulates lobbying. 147 Assuming that the two parties make "deals," this
Article focuses on the advantages both parties to a deal can attain when
lobbying is regulated and shows some alleged benefits. Yet, pointing at
these benefits does not necessarily nullify the benefits the public could
gain from the regulation of lobbying through legislation. Such a move
could regulate the relationships between decision-makers and those
whose job it is to change their minds. Regulation is not designed to deny
all access to decision-makers, but attempts to define how lobbying can
be done without introducing conflicts of interests or biased influence.
year in prison.
Yet, if the parties play the same game repeatedly and have no predetermined final
horizon, they may choose to cooperate so as to attain the best result for them. Tit for Tat is one form
of potential cooperation strategy in which players collaborate in the first round and, from the second
round on, each follows the strategy their rival chose in the previous round. Robert Axelrod has
shown that a Tit for Tat strategy yields the best results for all playing parties. This means that
players must never desert first, respond immediately and firmly when the other deserts, and remain
willing to cooperate in games subsequently to the other player's desertion. For more on this matter
see ROBERT AXELROD, THE EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION 57-69 (Basic Books, 1984).
For a definition and discussion of the Tit for Tat strategy see AVINASH DIXIT, SUSAN
SKEATH, & DAVID REILEY, GAMES OF STRATEGY 345-81 (New York, 2d ed., J. Repcheck ed.,
2004).
147. See supra Part 1H.
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Such legislation may follow from the desire to minimize the ability of
certain groups to influence decision-makers' stances. The (rather few)
relevant empirical studies conducted often came up with conflicting
results, but a 2010 study conducted in the U.S.' 48 showed that there is a
connection between the regulation of lobbying by legislation and the
degree of interest groups' influence on legislators. That study concluded
that when countries expanded the regulation of lobbying, the influence
of interest groups declined.149 Similarly, when regulation barriers were
lowered, the influence of interest groups on legislators expanded. 5 ° It
should be stated that the study did not address the nature of that
influence and its impact, but only showed a link between the regulation
of lobbying and independent legislation.
Another empirical study examined the impact of lobbying
regulation through legislation on the variety of groups that engage
decision-makers.' 5 ' That study examined the veracity of a claim that the
regulation of lobbying and the extent to which it is imposed creates entry
barriers that might lead to discrimination against certain interest groups,
presumably the stronger ones. 51 2 The study findings show that the impact
of regulation on the diversity of groups is negligible.1' 3 As noted in
the first argument above, existing empirical studies that pertain to the
impact of regulation on the number of registered lobbyists present
conflicting results.'5 4
Another important issue pertains to the distinction between
lobbyists and their clients in the specific context of lobbying regulation.
The alleged paradox presented and described here focuses on the
interests of legislators and lobbyist since comparative law shows that
regulating legislation in the field imposes duties on them (on the
government side, some parties impose such duties not only on
legislators, but also on civil servants and other elected officials).155 For
example, the duties of registration, reporting, and disclosure apply to
lobbyists, while restrictions on cooling periods and on the receipt of
benefits apply to decision-makers. The violation of these regulations
148. Joshua Ozymy, Assessing the Impact of Legislative Lobbying Regulations on Interest
Group Influence in US State Legislatures, 10 ST. POL. & POL'Y Q. 397,409-14 (2010).
149. See id. at 414.
150. Id. at411-14.
151. See generally Virginia Gray & David Lowery, State Lobbying Regulations and Their
Enforcement: Implicationsfor the Diversity of Interest Communities, 30 ST. & LOCAL GOV'T REV.
78 (1998).
152. Id. at 80-88.
153. Id. at 89-90.
154. See supra Part M.A.
155. CHARI, HOGAN &MuRPHY, supra note 1; see Naveh, supra note 11, 65-70.
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yields sanctions imposed only and exclusively on the perpetrating side.
56
Thus, this Article addressed the independent interests of these parties.
Though it may be true that such legislation might indirectly impact
interest groups and the public as a whole, this Article asks: How can
legislation that imposes duties on both legislators and lobbyists be
promoted even when these parties have the power to prevent or resist
its enactment?
The discussion in this Article made no distinction between
lobbyists' and their senders' (clients) interests since the arguments
herein assume that organized and represented organizations (unlike the
unorganized and unrepresented public) share interests. In this respect,
these interests are even identical: both the lobbyists and their senders
wish to improve their access to and influence on decision-makers while
lowering the costs of these actions. Reference to the field of lobbying
here (and elsewhere in the relevant literature) is the same as reference to
an industry or organized and represented groups. Lobbyists and their
clients are viewed as an industry that benefits from its moves vis-A-vis
decision-makers (or legislators in this case). In itself, that industry
should oppose any regulation that imposes costs, disclosure and
reporting duties, and sanctions. In that sense, its interest is not scattered
but coherent. And yet, though this industry is claimed to be powerful,
the regulation of lobbying is introduced in a growing number of
countries. The above explanations attempt to shed light on the optional
57
benefits of such legislation for both legislators and lobbyists.'
A distinction between lobbyists and their clients, however, could
yield several additional ideas concerning interests pertaining to the
regulation of lobbying through legislation. The explanations of the
lobbyists' interests in such regulation presented in this Articlelowering the costs of obtaining information and minimizing the
legislators' extortion powers-apply also to their clients since both
lower the costs of lobbying for them as well. Yet, one can conceive of
those clients' independent interests in promoting legislation that
regulates lobbying. For example, such regulation could lower the costs
of supervising interest groups and their lobbyists. Such supervision is
complex. Laws that include sanctions motivate lobbyists to protect their
reputation. That interest becomes even stronger when lobbying is viewed
as an occupation that wishes to please two target audiences-the
lobbyists' clients, and the decision-makers who pay lobbyists by
allowing them better access to them, which could bring the lobbyists
156.
157.

See supra Part 111.
See generally supra Part

M.
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new clients and improve the value of their reputation. 58 According to
this approach, lobbyists attempt to satisfy decision-makers and their
clients, all at the same time. Viewing lobbyists as having independent
interests increases the inherent threat of director-representative relations
that characterize the relationships between lobbyists and their clients.
That threat makes supervising lobbyists' operation more necessary, and
regulation could satisfy that.
One can conceive of another interest that strong interest groups may
have for the regulation of lobbying through legislation. A lobbyist's
decision on whether or not to represent an interest group can be viewed
as an important signal directed at legislators, but also at strong interest
groups. From the decision-makers' point of view, lobbyists lower the
chances of them making wrong decisions and invest in votes that yield
them no electorate gain, and help legislators understand when the
number of people and groups that can benefit from their decisions is
large enough to create such gain. The government has only partial
information concerning the size of the group and the potential gain it
could produce. Lobbyists help the government obtain such information
and decrease the uncertainty that accompanies decisions it makes. 5 9
Governments benefit groups when they believe their expected profits
exceed the costs of such benefits. From the interest groups' point of
view, they address the problem of the free participant and the difficulty
of forming organizations. Lobbyists help them address these problems
and could minimize them. When lobbyists represent interest groups, it is
a signal for decision-makers that the lobbyists believe these groups could
potentially yield, or else they would not represent them. 160 In such
situations, groups gain too because the presence of lobbyists indicates
that the groups have value, which improves the chances that decisionmakers would respond to their demands. On the other hand, when
lobbyists refuse to represent an interest group, decision-makers can
conclude that the lobbyists expect that group to provide low yield. In any
event, the presence of a lobbyist, according to this view, is a valuable
signal for both parties. Strong interest groups may want to promote the
regulation of lobbying because, as part of that regulation, the relations
between lobbyists and interest groups are made public. 161 That signal has
158. That approach appears in the literature. See, e.g., Scott Ainsworth & Itai Sened, The Role
of Lobbyists: Entrepreneurswith Two Audiences, 37 AM. J. POL. SCI. 834 (1993).
159. Daniel Weiser, Why Lobbying Is Legal and Important in the U.S., INVESTOPEDIA,
https://www.investopedia.com/articles/investing/043015/why-lobbying-legal-and-important-us.asp
(last updated Apr. 30, 2015).
160. Id.
161. Lobbyists, Interest Groups, and Power, LOBBYIT (Feb. 24, 2015), http://lobbyit.com/
lobbyists-interest-groups-and-power.
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value for strong interest groups that may wish to promote the regulation
of lobbying to show their value publicly, which in turn could improve
162
their chances of succeeding in interactions with decision-makers.
When considering opening the lobbying market to competition, it
would seem that lobbyists and their clients have conflicting interests.
Regulation that creates significant barriers that hinder entry to the
lobbying business might minimize competition, which conflicts with the
interests of their clients. Competition serves the lobbyists' clients since it
improves the quality of the product while lowering its cost. Conversely,
lobbyists who promote regulation could try to create stronger
barriers, which should help them minimize competition and form an
alleged cartel.
Either way, given that existing regulations apply to lobbyists and
decision-makers, this Article focuses163on their interests in promoting
legislation that imposes costs on them.
Finally, one may wonder whether lobbying is even effective and
whether lobbyists make a difference at all. Empirically, this is a very
challenging question because the effective measurement of lobbyists'
activities involves very many elements that are hard or impossible to
isolate. 164 Thus, the literature that attempted to answer that question
should be viewed critically while understanding the difficulty of
examining that issue. The attempts to appreciate the actual extent of
addressed issues such
lobbyists' influence as they appear in the literature
165 financial legislation, 1" budget allocation,1 67
trade,
as international
162. A study by Ainsworth and Sened created a model that examines the balance created when
groups are represented and not represented by lobbyists. Ainsworth & Sened, supra note 158, at
837-53. Among other things, their paper showed that the presence of lobbyists serves as a signal
that lowers or improves the value of a group. Id.
163. See supra Part ITLB, D.
164. John M. De Figueiredo & Brian Kelleher Richter, Advancing the EmpiricalResearch on
Lobbying 1-47 (Nat'l Bureau of Eco. Research, Working Paper No. 19698, 2013).
165. See generally Kathy Baylis & Hartley Furtan, Free-Riding on Federalism: Trade
Protection and the CanadianDairyIndustry, 29 CAN. PUB. POL'Y 145 (2003); Jeffrey M. Drope &
Wendy L. Hansen, PurchasingProtection? The Effect of Political Spending on U.S. Trade Policy,
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